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Since World War II there has been: (i) a rise in the fraction of time that married 
households allocate to market work, (ii) an increase in the rate of divorce, and 
(iii) a decline in the rate of marriage. What can explain this? It is argued here 
that technological progress in the household sector has saved on the need for 
labour at home. This makes it more feasible for singles to maintain their own 
home, and for married women to work. To address this question, a search 
model of marriage and divorce is developed. Household production benefits 
from labour-saving technological progress. 
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1 Introduction
Consider the following two facts that have helped reshape U.S. households over the last 50
years:
1. A smaller proportion of the adult population is now married compared with 50 years
ago Figure 1.1 Eighty-two percent of the female population in 1950 was married
(out of non-widows between the ages of 18 and 64). By 2000 this had declined to
62 percent. Adults now spend a smaller fraction of their lives married.2 In 1950
females spent about 88 percent of their life married as compared with 60 percent in
1995. Underlying these facts are two factors.
(a) Between 1950 and 1990, the divorce rate doubled from 11 to 23 divorces per 1,000
married women (between the ages of 18 to 64) Figure 2.
(b) At the same time, the marriage rate declined. Exactly how much is somewhat
sensitive to the particular age group used for the calculations.3 In 1950 there
were 211 marriages per 1,000 unmarried women as compared with just 82 in 2000
(again, out of non-widows between the ages of 18 to 64).
2. The amount of time allocated to market work by married households has increased
1 Sources: (1) The marital status of the population is reported in the U.S. Census Bureau publications
Marital Status and Living Arrangements (March 1950 to March 1998) and Americas Families and Living
Arrangements (March 1999 to March 2000). (2) The fraction of life spent married is from Schoen (1983)
and Schoen and Standish (2001). (3) The divorce and marriage rates shown in Figure 2 are contained in
Clarke (1995a,b).
2 The fraction of time spent married is calculated as follows: First, data on life expectancy, e, and the
fractions of total life spent as never married, n, married, m, and divorced, d are collected from Schoen (1983)
and Schoen and Standish (2001). This data covers each year between 1950 and 1980, and the years 1983,
1988, and 1995. Second, on the basis of these numbers, the gures presented in Figure 1 are then calculated
as
em
en  18 + em+ ed :
3 The basic problem is that data is not available for marriages by age group. Data is available on the
number of unmarried women by age group. Hence, the marriage rate for a particular age group is computed
as the total number of marriages divided by the total number of unmarried women in the given age group.
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Figure 1: Marriage, 1950-2000.
markedly over the postwar period see Figure 3.4 This is mainly due to a rise in
labor-force participation by married females. In particular,
(a) In 1950 a married household in the 24-to-54-year-old age group spent 25.5 hours
per week per person working in the market. This compared with 31.3 hours per
week in a single household. Thus, singles worked more in the market on average
than did married couples. At the time, only 23.7 percent of married women
worked, compared with 78 percent of single ones.
(b) By the year 1990 labor e¤ort expended per person by married households had
risen to 33.5 hours per week. This exceeded the 30.6 hours spent by a single
household. Almost as many married females were participating in the labor mar-
ket (71 percent) as single ones (80 percent).
4 Source: Simple tabulations based on data extracted from IPMUS-USA, Minnesota Population Center,
University of Minnesota. See Section 6.1.2 for more detail.
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Figure 2: Rates of Marriage and Divorce, 1950-2000.
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What economic factors can explain these facts? The idea here is that technological
progress played a major role in inducing these changes.5 Two hundred years ago the U.S.
was largely a rural economy. The household was the basic production unit, with the family
producing a large fraction of what it consumed. At the time, most marriages were arranged
by the parents of young adults. Key considerations were whether or not the potential groom
would be a good provider, and the bride a good housekeeper.6 Over time more and more
household goods and services could be purchased outside the home, such as packaged foods
and ready-made clothes. Additionally capital goods, ranging from washing machines to
microwave ovens, were brought into the home greatly reducing the time needed to maintain
a household.7 This had two e¤ects. First, it allowed all adults, both married and single,
to devote more time to market activities and less to household production. Second, it
lowered the economic incentives to get married by reducing the benets of the traditional
specialization of women at housework, and of men at market work. The reduction of the
economic benets of marriage allowed the modern criteria of mutual attraction between
mates to come to the fore, a trend from economics to romance in the words of Ogburn
and Nimko¤ (1955).
To model this idea formally, a Becker (1965) - cum - Reid (1934) model of household
production is embedded into a Mortensen (1988) style spouse-search model. Three key
ingredients are injected into this framework. First, there are economies of scale in household
5 The impact of technological progress on household formation was addressed some time ago in a classic
and prescient book by Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955). The book analyzes the impact of technological progress
on family size, marriage and divorce, and female labor-force participation, among other things.
6 Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955, pp. 40-41) quote Godeys The Ladys Book in 1831 as writing No sensible
man ever thought a beautiful wife was worth as much as one that could make good pudding or in 1832
as stating Among our industrious fore-fathers it was a xed maxim that a young lady should never be
permitted to marry until she had spun for herself a set of body, bed and table linen. From this custom all
unmarried women are called spinsters in legal proceedings.
7 Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005, Section 1.2) and Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke
(2005, Section V.A) present evidence that technological advance occurred in the household sector over the
course of the last century. The latter paper argues that the impact of this technological progress started
to gather steam at the start of the baby boom. This is relevant for the analysis in Section 7. Sometimes
seemingly small household inventions can have a big impact on time spent at home. Albanesi and Olivetti
(2006) argue that the introduction of infant formula promoted labor-force participation by married women.
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consumption and production. Second, it is assumed that purchased household inputs and
labor are substitutes in household production. Third, it is presumed that nonmarket goods
exhibit stronger diminishing marginal utility than market goods. Some theoretical results
are established for this framework. The economies of scale in household consumption and
production provide an economic motive for marriage.8 It pays for a couple to pool their
resources together. Now, suppose that the price of purchased household inputs declines over
time. Labor will be displaced from the home, given that household inputs and labor are
substitutes in household production. Furthermore, if there is stronger diminishing marginal
utility in nonmarket goods vis à vis market goods then married households will allocate a
smaller fraction of their spending on the inputs for household production than will single
households. As a consequence, single households gain the most from a decline in the price of
purchased household inputs. Thus, a fall in the price of purchased household inputs causes
the relative benets of single life to increase. Singles searching for a spouse will become
pickier. For those currently married, the value of a divorce will rise, because the value
of becoming single is higher. Thus, the theoretical analysis suggests that the framework
developed has promise for explaining the observed rise in the number of single households,
together with the increase in hours worked by married ones.
To gauge the quantitative potential of the framework, the model is solved numerically.
The models predictions for the time paths of labor-force participation and vital statistics
are compared with the U.S. data. It is found that the developed framework can potentially
explain a substantial portion of the rise in divorce, the fall in marriage, and the increase in
married female labor-force participation that occurred during the later half of the twentieth
century. At the outset it will be stated, though, that the goal of the analysis is not to
simulate an all-inclusive model of household formation and labor-force participation. Rather,
the idea here is to see whether or not the simple mechanisms put forth have the potential
8 Love provides an additional motivation for marriage in the model. The interaction between monetary
and non-monetary incentives to get married is also analyzed by Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2005). In
their framework a higher level of inequality generates a higher degree of marital sorting. This occurs because
the economic costs of marrying down increase for the rich. They also present empirical evidence supporting
this prediction.
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quantitative power to explain the postwar observations on household formation and labor-
force participation. This is done without regard to the many other possible explanations for
the same set of facts some of which could be embedded into a more general version of the
developed framework. Theory, by its essence, is a process of abstraction. Therefore, some
factors that may be important for understanding the phenomena under study have been left
out of the analysis, both for purposes of clarity and tractability.9
For example, the tremendous amount of technological progress in contraception that
occurred over the last century greatly reduced the risk out-of-wedlock sexual relationships.
It seems very likely that this provided impetus for a fall in marriage and a rise in divorce.
Interestingly, the fraction of the population that is married did not show monotonic decline
over the course of the entire 20th century. It actually increased during the baby boom years.
This resulted in a hump-shaped time path for marriage during the last century. It might be
hard for a theory based on improvements in contraception, alone, to explain this. As will
be argued in detail later on, however, the current theory has the potential to do so. The
liberalization of divorce laws in the 1970s is often thought of as being a prime candidate
for causing the rise in divorce. The adoption of no-fault unilateral divorce laws by many
states in the 1970s coincides well with the rise of divorce rate during the same period. The
empirical evidence on the e¤ect of divorce laws is controversial, however. A recent study
by Wolfers (2003) nds that unilateral divorce laws explain very little of the rise in divorce
rates. Furthermore, except for a spike associated with World War II, the rate of divorce rose
more or less continuously over the last century from about 4 per 1,000 women in 1900, to
about 10 in 1941 (a doubling), to about 23 today (another doubling). [In fact, Ogburn and
9 For instance, Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) study the impact of a narrowing of the gender
gap on female labor-force participation. They nd that this e¤ect alone can only explain a small amount of
rise in female-force participation. This transpires because without labor saving household technologies the
elasticity of labor supply is very small. Olivetti (2006) also nds that the gender gap does not account for
much of the upward movement in participation. She attributes the rise in work to an increase in the returns
to experience associated with female labor-force participation. Additionally, Erosa, Fuster and Restuccia
(2005) argue that the gender gap largely reects the impact of children on the productivity of women in the
labor market. Children lower the amount of time over a lifetime that a woman will spend at work. This
leads to reduced wage growth, and in turn lower incentives to invest in human capital.
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Nimko¤ (1955) write about the trend.] So, there seems to be room in the literature for the
explanation proposed here that technological advance in the household sector contributed
to the rise in divorce and the decline in marriage.
2 The Economic Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of people with unit mass. Individuals have
nite lives. Specically, at the beginning of each period an individual faces the constant
probability of dying, . Thus,  people die each period. The individuals who have passed
on are replaced by a newly-borne generation of exactly the same size. There are two types
of individuals: those who are single and those who are married. Each individual is endowed
with one unit of time, which can be divided between market and nonmarket work. A unit of
market work pays the wage rate, w. At the beginning of each period singles participate in a
marriage market, assuming that they have survived. Each single is randomly paired up with
someone else. The prospective couple then draws a certain level of suitability or quality, b,
from a xed distribution. The question facing a single is: should s/he marry, or wait until a
better match comes along. For a married couple match quality evolves over time, according
to some xed distribution. For simplicity, assume that married couples die together at the
start of a period with probability . If they survive then they must decide whether or not
to remain married. After the marriage and divorce decisions, individuals enter the labor
market. A single agent must decide how much of his one unit of time to devote to market
work. A married couple must determine how much of their two units of time to spend in
the labor force. For simplicity, it is assumed that there are no assets markets. Hence, there
is no borrowing or lending, etc., in the economy. Last, as will become clear, there are no
matching externalities present in the model. The aggregate state of the marriage market
will not inuence households decision making.
2.1 Production
Start with production. Two types of goods are produced, market and nonmarket ones.
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2.1.1 Household Production
Suppose that nonmarket goods, n, are made in line with the following household production
function:
n = [d + (1  )h]1=; for 0 <  < 1; (1)
where d denotes purchases of household inputs, and h is the amount of time spent on
housework.10 Let purchased household inputs sell at price p, measured in terms of time.
The idea here is that over time p will drop. Specically, let p fall monotonically to some lower
bound p> 0. In response households will substitute out of using labor toward using more
purchased inputs. Note that it has been assumed that purchased inputs and time are more
substitutable in production than Cobb-Douglas; i.e.,  > 0. Hence, as p declines, household
production will become more goods intensive and less labor intensive.11 Examples of labor-
saving household inputs abound: disposable diapers, frozen foods, microwave ovens, washing
machines, and tupperware.
2.1.2 Market Production
The production of market goods is done in line with the constant-returns-to-scale production
technology
y = wl; (2)
where y is aggregate output and l is aggregate employment. Given the linear form for the
aggregate production function, w will represent the real wage rate in equilibrium. Real wages
will grow over time. In particular, suppose that w increases monotonically to some nite
upper bound w. There is no physical or, as mentioned, nancial capital in the economy.
Market output y is used for two purposes: viz, direct consumption and as an input into
household production. Specically, one unit of output can be used to produce one unit of
10 For some uses of household production theory in macroeconomics see Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright
(1991), Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), and Parente, Rogerson and
Wright (2000), and Rios-Rull (1993).
11 Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) employ this notion of labor-shedding technological
progress in their study of the post-1974 rise in the skill premium.
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nal consumption or 1=p units of household inputs. Thus, the economys resource constraint
reads
c+ pd = y;
where c and d represent aggregate consumption and purchases of household inputs, respec-
tively.
2.2 Tastes
Singles: Let the momentary utility function for a single read
U s(c; n) =  ln(c  c) + (1  )n=; with 0 <  < 1; 0  c < 1;  < 0:
Here c and n denote the persons consumption of market and nonmarket goods, respectively.
The constant c represents a xed cost associated with maintaining a household.12 13 This
represents the rst of two sources of scale economies in household consumption. If a single
dies he realizes a utility level of zero in the afterlife, an innocuous normalization. Note that
leisure has been excluded from the tastes. This is in line with the Beckerian (1965, p. 504)
theory of household production since although the social philosopher might have to dene
precisely the concept of leisure, the economist can reach all his traditional results as well as
many more without introducing it at all.The idea here is that often all one cares about is
time spent in the market versus at home, and the above framework will capture this through
the production side of things. Additionally, observe that a separable form for the utility
function is chosen, as is conventional in macroeconomics. This minimizes the role placed on
home production.14
12 See footnote 15 for more detail.
13 The xed cost is presumed to be the same for both single and married households. This is for theoretical
convenience, only. Casual empiricism suggests that it should be smaller for single households. Footnote 26
reports some results for the quantitative analysis where this assumption is relaxed. Also, one might expect
that there are some xed costs for home goods too. Some results for this case are also discussed in Footnote
26.
14 The framework is closer to the home production setup used by Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) as
opposed to the Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) one. The separable consumption setup without
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Married Individuals: Tastes for a married individual are given by
Um(c; n) + b =  ln((c  c)=2) + (1  )(n=2)= + b; with  < 0 <  < 1,
where c and n represent the households consumption of market and nonmarket goods. To
determine an individuals consumption, c c and n are divided by the household equivalence
scale, 2, to get consumptions per member, (c c)=2 and n=2. Since 0 <  < 1, this implies
that it is less expensive to provide the second member of the household with consumption
than it is the rst. This is the second source of economies of scale in consumption. Note
that the utility function for nonmarket goods is more concave than the ln function; i.e.,
 < 0. The importance of this restriction will become clear as the theory is developed. This
constraint is not imposed in the quantitative analysis. Therefore, the data will speak to the
sign and magnitude of . Observe that the bliss from a match, b, can be negative. Finally,
if a married couple die they realize a zero-utility level thereafter.
2.3 Match Quality
Recall that when singles meet they draw a match quality, b. Suppose that b is normally
distributed so that
b  N(s; 2s);
where s and 
2
s are the mean and variance of the single distribution. Let the cumulative
distribution function that singles draw from be represented by S(b). Likewise, each period
a married couple draws a new value for the match quality variable, b. Suppose that last
period the couple had a match quality of b 1. Now, assume that b evolves according to the
following autoregressive process:
b = (1  )m + b 1 + m
p
1  2, with   N(0; 1).
leisure is just a special case of the nonseparable consumption setup with leisure. In fact, the former can
be nested in latter. Therefore, quantitatively speaking, the model can only perform better when adopting
nonseparable tastes and allowing for leisure, because the estimation routine will pick the parameter values
that maximize the t. In practice, though, a lack of substitution in tastes can often be compensated for
changing the degree of complementarity/substitutability in production. Without a time series on leisure per
se (as opposed to nonmarket time) the value of including it seems minimal. Indeed, the models of Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991) and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) produce very similar results.
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Here m and 
2
m denote the long-run mean and variance for the process b. The parameter 
is the coe¢ cient of autocorrelation. Write the (conditional) cumulative distribution function
that married couples draw from as M(bjb 1).
3 Household Decision Making
How will a single agent divide his or her time between market and nonmarket work? When
will he or she choose to get married? Likewise, how will a married couple split their time
between market work and housework? When will they choose to divorce? To answer these
questions, let V (b) denote the expected lifetime utility for an individual who is currently in
a marriage with match quality b. Similarly, W will represent the expected lifetime utility
for an agent who is single today. Imagine that two singles meet and draw a match quality
of b. They will choose to marry if V (b)  W and to remain single if V (b) < W . Likewise,
consider a married couple with match quality b. They will pick to remain married when
V (b)  W and choose to divorce if V (b) < W . Thus, the marriage and divorce decisions are
summarized by Table 1. Note that given the absence of asset markets, b will be the only
state variable at the individual level that is relevant for determining expected lifetime utility.
At the aggregate level, prices and wages will also matter. Recall that wages are rising over
time, and that prices are falling. Thus, W and V are functions of time. Given this, W 0 and
V 0 will denote the value functions for single and married lives that obtain next period; i.e.,
the prime symbol connotes these functionsdependence on time. So, how are the functions
V (b) and W determined? This question will be addressed next.
Table 1: Marriage and Divorce Decisions
Single Married
Marry if V (b)  W Remain Married if V (b)  W
Remain Single if V (b) < W Divorce if V (b) < W
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3.1 Singles
The dynamic programming problem for a single agent appears as
W = max
c;n;d;h
fU s(c; n) + 
Z
max[V 0(b0);W 0]dS(b0)g; (P1)
subject to
c = w(1  h)  wpd; (3)
and (1).15 The discount factor  reects the probability of dying. That is, if e is the
persons subjective discount factor then  = (1   )e. Observe that while the individual
is single today, the agent picks married or single life next period to maximize welfare, as
the term max[V 0(b0);W 0] in (P1) makes clear.16 Again, recall that the value functions are
dependant upon technology, and hence time. Therefore, for a given level of match quality, b,
the value function will return a di¤erent level of expected utility tomorrow versus today. This
dependence of the value functions upon time is implicitly indicated through the use of the
prime symbols attached to V and W , which di¤erentiates their functional forms tomorrow
from their forms today. Since S(b) is some xed distribution, the aggregate state of the
marriage market does not impact on the individuals decision making.
3.2 Couples
The dynamic programming problem for a married couple reads
V (b) = max
c;n;d;h
fUm(c; n) + b+ 
Z
max[V 0(b0);W 0]dM(b0jb)g; (P2)
subject to
c = w(2  h)  wpd; (4)
15 It can now be seen that the constant c does represent a xed cost associated with maintaining a
household. Write Us as Us(ec; n), where ec denotes the consumption of market goods by a single household.
Let c denote the xed cost of maintaining a household. The households budget constraint will now appear
as ec = w(1  h) wpd  c: Rewrite the budget constraint as ec+ c = w(1  h) wpd. Next, dene c = ec+ c
so that ec = c  c. Use this to substitute out for ec in Us and the above budget constraint. This setting has
transformed into the one presented in the text.
16 The structure of problems (P1) and (P2) is similar to the typical search/work problem see Andofatto
and Gomme (1996), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), and Jovanovic (1987) for some examples.
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and (1). Problem (P2) is similar in structure to problem (P1) with three di¤erences: (i) the
utility function for married agents di¤ers from single agents due to scale e¤ects in household
consumption; (ii) a married couple realizes bliss from marriage and this is autocorrelated
over time; (iii) the couple has two units of time to allocate between market and nonmarket
work. Again, note that while an individual is married today, the agent chooses married or
single life next period to maximize welfare. Last, the aggregate state of the marriage market
does not impinge on the couples decision making, because M(b0jb) is a xed distribution.
4 Equilibrium
Formulating an equilibrium to the above economy is surprisingly simple. First, given the
linear market production function (2), there is no need to determine the equilibrium wage, w.
Second, since there are no nancial markets, there is no interaction between households other
than through the marriage market. As far as consumption and production are concerned,
each household is an island unto themselves. Also, there are no matching externalities in
the model. Each single is matched with a potential mate each period. This pair then draws
a quality for the match, b, from the xed distribution S(b). Likewise, the b for a couple
evolves according to the xed distribution M(b0jb). Hence, household decision making is
not inuenced by the aggregate state of the marriage market. Therefore, characterizing an
equilibrium for the economy amounts to solving the programming problems (P1) and (P2).
Thus, it is easy to establish that an equilibrium for the above economy both exists and is
unique.17
17 In a nutshell the argument is as follows: Recall that limt!1 pt =p and limt!1 wt = w. It is easy to
deduce that a pair of unique steady-state value functions, W  and V , exist that will solve the dynamic
programming problems (P1) and (P2). To see this note that (P1) and (P2) dene an operator (W;V ) =
T(W 0; V 0). By standard arguments, it can be readily deduced that the operator T is a contraction mapping
on the space of continuous bounded functions with norm jjW;V jj = sup jW j+ sup jV j. Working backwards
in time from the steady state it is also easy to see that the value functions W and V will exist and be unique
at each stage of the recursion.
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4.1 Vital Statistics
Computing vital statistics for the economy is a relatively straightforward task. Suppose that
the economy exits the previous period with the (non-normalized) distributionM 1(b 1) over
match quality for married agents. The fractions of agents who were married and single last
period, m 1 and s 1, are therefore given bym 1 =
R
dM 1(b 1) and s 1 = 1 
R
dM 1(b 1).
Now, at the beginning of the current period the fraction  of populace dies. These people are
replaced by newly-borne single agents. All agents will then take a draw, b, for their match
quality. After this, they will make their marriage and divorce decisions in line with Table 1.
Dene the set of match quality shocks for which it is in an individuals best interest to live
in a married household, orM, by
M = fb : V (b)  Wg:
The current-period distribution over match quality for married agents, or M(b), will then
read18
M(b) = (1  )
Z
M\[ 1;b]
Z
dM(ebjb 1)dM 1(b 1) + [s 1 + m 1]Z
M\[ 1;b]
dS(eb): (5)
Therefore, the fractions of agents who are married and single in current period, m and
s, are given by m =
R
dM(b) and s = 1  R dM(b). The fraction of people getting married
in the current period is [s 1+ m 1]
R
M dS(
eb), while the proportion going through a divorce
is given by (1  ) RMc R dM(ebjb 1)dM 1(b 1), whereMc is the complement ofM.
5 Qualitative Analysis
It is now time to entertain the following two questions, at least at a theoretical level:
1. How does technological progress a¤ect the amount of time spent on housework?
2. How does technological progress a¤ect the economic return from married versus single
life?
18 Note that when a single agent dies he is replaced by another single agent. This explains why there is
no term reecting the probability of dying multiplying s 1 in the formula for M(b).
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Before answering these two questions, it may pay to take stock of the key features of the
model and to discuss the role that they play in the subsequent analysis.
 Household Equivalence Scale, 0 <  < 1. This provides an economic incentive for
marriage. If a two-person household can live more economically than a single-person
household then there are gains from marriage.
 Purchased Household Inputs-Housework Substitutability in Home Production, 0 <  <
1. Suppose that over time the price of purchased household inputs declines. The higher
the degree of substitutability between purchased inputs and housework the bigger will
be the labor-saving impact of technological progress on home production.
 Strong Diminishing Marginal Utility for Nonmarket Goods,  < 0. Married couples will
consume more of all goods than singles do. If the utility function for nonmarket goods
is more concave than the one for market goods then married couples will allocate a
higher fraction of their spending (as compared with singles) to market goods, c, relative
to the inputs into home production, d and h.
 Fixed Cost of Household Maintenance, c  0. This gives another economic incentive
for marriage. Moreover, at low levels of income households will have limited resources
to allocate for market consumption, after meeting the xed cost of household main-
tenance. This will force poorer households, or singles, to devote a higher fraction of
their time to market work relative to richer households, or married couples.
 Marital Bliss, b. This creates a noneconomic incentive for marriage.
 The Probability of Dying, 0 <  < 1. This proves useful in the quantitative analysis.
It increases the fraction of people who are single, ceteris paribus.
The task is now to establish that the features outlined above do indeed play their assigned
roles.
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5.1 The Time-Allocation Problem
The Problem: To this end, consider the time-allocation problem that faces a household of
size, z. It is static in nature and appears as
I(z; p; w) = max
c;n;h;d
f ln(c  c
z
) + (1  )( n
z
)=g; (P3)
subject to
c  c = w(z   h)  wpd  c; (6)
and
n = [d + (1  )h]1=:
Observe that versions of problem (P3) are embedded into (P1) and (P2), a fact that can be
seen by setting z = 1 and z = 2.
The Solution: By using the constraints for n and c   c in the objective function (P3),
and then maximizing with respect to d and h, the following two rst-order conditions are
obtained:

c  cwp = (1  )z
  [d + (1  )h]= 1d 1; (7)
and
w
c  c = (1  )z
  [d + (1  )h]= 1(1  )h 1: (8)
These two rst-order conditions have standard interpretations. For instance, the left-hand
side of (7) represents the marginal cost of an extra unit of purchased household inputs,
d. The marginal unit of purchased household inputs costs wp in terms of forgone market
consumption. Since an extra unit of market consumption has a utility value of =(c  c) this
leads to a sacrice of [=(c  c)]wp in terms of forgone utility. Likewise, the right-hand side
of this equation gives the marginal benet of an extra unit of purchased household inputs.
These extra goods will increase household production by [d + (1   )h]1= 1d 1. The
marginal utility of nonmarket goods is (1  )z (n) 1. Thus, the marginal benet of an
extra unit of purchased household inputs is (1 )z (n) 1 [d+ (1  )h]1= 1d 1,
which is the right-hand side of (7). The two rst-order conditions (7) and (8), in conjunction
with the budget constraint (6), determine a solution for c, d and h.
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5.2 Results
Everything is now set up to address the two questions poised at the start of this section.
5.2.1 Technological Progress and Time Allocations
So, how does technological progress a¤ect the amount of time allocated to homework? First,
a fall in the price of purchased household inputs, p, leads to a reduction in the amount of
housework, h, and a rise in the amount of market work, z  h. When the price of purchased
household inputs drops households move away from using labor in household production
toward using goods (given the assumption that production exhibits more substitutability
than Cobb-Douglas or that  > 0). Second, a rise in wages, w, leads to an increase in the
amount of housework, h, done. At low levels of income, the marginal utility of market goods
is high due to the xed cost of household maintenance, c. Thus, people devote a lot of time
to laboring in the market. As wages increase the xed cost for household maintenance bites
less and people relax their work e¤ort in market. Proposition 1 formalizes all of this.
Proposition 1 Housework, h, is:
(i) increasing in the price of household commodities, p;
(ii) decreasing in the xed cost of household maintenance, c;
(iii) increasing in real wages, w (when c > 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark Real wages, w, will have no e¤ect on time allocations in the absence of a xed cost
for household maintenance, c; i.e., when c = 0. To see this, substitute (6) into (7) and (8)
and note that the rst-order conditions depend on c=w. Thus, as the economy develops the
impact of wages on housework will vanish, since c=w  ! 0 as w  !1.
5.2.2 Household Size and Allocations
Can anything be said about the allocations, (c ; d; h), within a two-person household vis à vis
a one-person household? The lemma below provides the answer, where the superscripts m
and s are attached to the allocations for married and single households. Before proceeding,
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it will be noted that the lemma is a key step along the road to proving that a fall in the price
for purchased household inputs reduces the utility di¤erential between married and single
life, when holding xed the amount of marital bliss. It shows that a married household
spends less on purchased household inputs, relative to market consumption (over and above
the xed cost of household maintenance), than does a single one. Likewise, the corollary to
the lemma is instrumental for establishing that a rise in wages reduces the economic benet
from marriage. It proves that a married household consumes more market goods than a
single household does.
Lemma 1 The allocations in married and single households have the following relationships:
(i) (cm   c) > [(2  c=w)=(1  c=w)](cs   c);
(ii) dm < [(2  c=w)=(1  c=w)]ds;
(iii) hm < [(2  c=w)=(1  c=w)]hs.
The above relationships hold with equality when  = 0.
Proof. Again, see the Appendix.
Corollary Married households consume more market goods than do single households:
(i) (cm   c)=2 > (cs   c);
(ii) cm > cs:
The above relationships hold even when c =  = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, note that a married household has 2  c=w units of disposable time, after netting
out the xed cost of household maintenance, to spend on various things. A single household
has 1  c=w units of disposable time. Lemma 1 states that a married household will spend a
larger fraction of their adjusted time endowment on the consumption of market goods than
will a single household. The lemma also implies that married households spend less than
single households do on household inputs, relative to market goods. That is, pdm=(cm  
c) < pds=(cs   c) and whm=(cm   c) < whs=(cs   c) so that [pdm + whm]=(cm   c) <
[pds+whs]=(cs  c), at least when  < 0. When nonmarket goods exhibit strong diminishing
marginal utility, bigger households will favor (relative to the consumption patterns of smaller
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ones) the use of market consumption for their larger adjusted endowment of time. Part (i)
of the corollary states that after paying the xed cost of household maintenance, market
consumption per person is e¤ectively higher in a married household than a single one. Also,
married households spend more in total on market goods than do single households.
5.2.3 Technological Progress and the Economic Benets of Married versus Sin-
gle Life
Last, how does technological progress a¤ect the utility di¤erential between married and
single life (holding xed the amount of marital bliss)? To address this, let um denote the
level of momentary utility realized from married life, sans marital bliss, and us represent the
level of utility realized from single life. From problem (P3) it is apparent that um = I(2; p; w)
and us = I(1; p; w).
Proposition 2 The utility di¤erential between married and single life (sans marital bliss),
um   us, is:
(i) increasing in the price of purchased household inputs, p;
(ii) decreasing in real wages, w (when c > 0).
Proof. The rst part of the proposition can be established by applying the envelope theorem
to problem (P3). It can be calculated that
d(um   us)
dp
=  w[ d
m
cm   c  
ds
cs   c ] > 0; (9)
where the sign of the above expression follows from Lemma 1(i, ii). To prove the second
part of the lemma, note that
d(um   us)
dw
= [
2  hm   pdm
cm   c  
1  hs   pds
cs   c ]
=

w
[
cm
cm   c  
cs
cs   c ] =

w
[
1
1  c=cm  
1
1  c=cs ] < 0; (10)
where the sign of the above expression derives from the fact that cm > cs, or part (ii) of the
corollary to Lemma 1.
Thus, technological advance in the form of either a falling price for purchased household
inputs or rising real wages reduces the economic gain from marriage. A fall in the price of
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purchased household inputs leads to a substitution away from the use of labor in household
production toward the use of purchased household inputs. Single households use labor-saving
products the most intensively, so they realize the greatest gain [i.e., dm=(cm c) < ds=(cs c)
in (9)].19 The assumption of strong diminishing marginal utility for nonmarket goods
( < 0) is important for the result that a drop in the price of purchased household inputs
will reduce the economic return to marriage. Suppose that  = 0. Then, prices will have
no impact on the utility di¤erential between married and single life, because dm=(cm   c) =
ds=(cs   c) by Lemma 1. The presence of a xed cost is not important for obtaining the
desired result, since the lemma still holds when c = 0. To take stock of the situation so
far, a decline in the price of household products will lead to a decrease in housework by
Proposition 1. It also causes a reduction in the economic return to marriage by Proposition
2. Therefore, a decline in the price of purchased household inputs has the potential for
explaining Observations 1 and 2 made in the Introduction.
As wages increase, the xed cost for household maintenance matters less. The xed cost
for household maintenance bites the most for single households [i.e., c=cm < c=cs in (10)].
Therefore, single households benet the most from a rise in wages. From (10) it is immediate
that a change in wages will have no impact in the absence of a xed cost (c = 0) on the utility
di¤erential between married and single life. Also, note this result does not depend upon the
assumption of strong diminishing marginal utility of nonmarket goods since the Corollary to
Lemma 1 holds even when  = 0. Now, recall from Proposition 1 that an increase in wages
will cause housework to rise. Therefore, a rise in real wages, alone, cannot account for both
Observations 1 and 2.
19 While the Proposition 2 is very suggestive, given the general nature of the adopted setup it is hard
to say much concrete about the impact of technological progress on marriage and divorce, per se. To do
so requires either restricting the theoretical setup or numerically simulating the model. The latter is done
in the next section. The former strategy is pursued in the Appendix. It can be shown that a one-period
decline in the price for purchased household inputs leads to a one-period drop in the rate of marriage and a
one-period increase in the divorce rate. By specializing the stochastic structure of the model further, it can
be established that a steady-state decline in the price for purchased household inputs leads to a fall in the
steady-state fraction of the population that is married.
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5.2.4 The Economic Value of Marriage
What is the economic value of married life? One way to measure this is to compute the
required income, or compensation, that is necessary to make a single person as well o¤ as
a married one with no bliss (b = 0). This can be done by solving the following expenditure
problem:
E(p; w; um) = minecs;eds;ehsfecs + pw eds + wehsg; (P4)
subject to (1) and
 ln(ecs   c) + (1  )(ens)= = um: (11)
Equation (11) states that the momentary utility level realized by a single agent must equal
that of a married one with no bliss, or um. Hence, problem (P4) nds the minimum level of
expenditure that makes a single person as well o¤ as a married one. A consumption-based
measure of the economic benets from marriage is then given by
ln[
E(p; w; um)
w
];
where w is the value of a single agents time endowment. The solution to the expenditure
problem is surprisingly simple and natural.
Lemma 2 The compensating di¤erential between married and single life is given by
ln[E(p; w; um)=w] = ln[21  + (1  1=2)c=w]:
Proof. See the Appendix, one more time.
The result is very appealing and the underlying intuition straightforward. For exposi-
tional purposes, temporarily set c = 0. On the one hand, a married household has twice
the time endowment of a single one. On the other hand, a married household must provide
consumption to twice as many members. On net, due to economies of scale in household con-
sumption, a married household realizes 21  (=2=2) as much consumption as a single one.
Now, when c > 0 an adjustment must be made for the presence of the xed cost of household
maintenance. This reduces a singles consumption by c but a marrieds one by only c=2, so
that the di¤erence is (1   1=2)c. Note that the income needed to make a single person as
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well o¤ as a married one is not a function of the price of purchased household inputs; one
just needs to scale up a singles income by the constant fraction 21  + (1  1=2)c=w. It is
a function of the wage rate, though. At higher wage rates the xed cost bites less. Finally,
Lemma 2 establishes that there is an economic incentive for marriage provided that there is
some form of economies of scale in consumption or production; i.e., whenever either c > 0
or  < 1.
It may seem a bit puzzling that a fall in price reduces the utility di¤erential between
married and single life, um us, but has no impact on the compensating di¤erential between
these two situations, ln[21  + (1   1=2)c=w]. Suppose that one makes the compensation
outlined by (P4). Then, married and single households will use labor-saving products in the
same intensity, in the sense that dm=(cm  c) = ds=(cs  c) see the proof of Lemma 2. This
implies that any further change in price will have no impact on the utility di¤erential, um us,
as can readily be seen from (9). Thus, for price changes the compensation only has to be
done once; that is, once the compensation has been made, a subsequent price change a¤ects
married and single households commensurately. This suggests that for tracking over time the
impact of technological progress on the utility di¤erential from marriage the compensating
di¤erential is not a perfect measure.
6 Quantitative Analysis
The Households Dynamic Programming Problems A Restatement : Given the static na-
ture of the households time allocation problem (P3), note that the dynamic programming
problems for single and married households (P1) and (P2) can be rewritten as
W = I(1; p; w) + 
Z
max[V 0(b0);W 0]dS(b0);
and
V (b) = I(2; p; w) + b+ 
Z
max[V 0(b0);W 0]dM(b0jb):
Here I(z; p; w) gives the maximal level of momentary utility that a z-person household
can obtain, given that the price of purchased household inputs is p and that the wage
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rate is w. The fact that for a household of a particular size, z, it is possible to calculate
their current level of utility, I(z; p; w), without regard to their marriage/divorce decision
is very useful. Given a sequence of prices and wages, fpt; wtg1t , it possible to compute
from (P3) the associated sequence of momentary utilities for single and married households,
fI(1; pt; wt); I(2; pt; wt)g1t .
6.1 Matching the Model with the Data
In order to simulate the model, numbers must be selected for the various parameters. Except
for ve of the parameters, almost nothing is known about appropriate values. Additionally,
time series for prices and wages need to be inputted into the simulation. Values for the
models parameters will be assigned either on the basis of a priori information or they will
be estimated.
6.1.1 A priori information
Take the model period to be one year. In line with convention, say following Kydland and
Prescott (1982), set the subjective discount factor at 0.96. The discount factor used in
decision making must reect the individuals probability of survival, 1  . A persons life
expectancy is 1=. Thus, if (marriageable) life expectancy for an adult is taken to be 47
years then 1= = 47. Therefore, set  = 0:096  (1   1=47). Next, let  = 0:77. This is in
line with the O.E.C.D.s household equivalence scale that treats the second adult in a family
as consuming an additional 0.7 times the amount of the rst adult. Hence, the parameter
 solves 1=2 = 1=(1:0 + 0:7). A series for wages can be constructed from the U.S. data.
To do this, divide disposable income by hours worked to obtain a measure of compensation
per hour.20 The use of disposable income should (partially) take into account the changes
in taxes (and transfers payments) that occurred over this time period. Between 1950 and
2000 compensation per hour worked rose 3.0 times. Thus, the analysis simply presumes
20 Specically, take the series for Disposable Personal Income from the National Income and Product
Accounts and divide it through by Hours Worked by Full-Time and Part-Time Employees, both available
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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that wages rise at 100 ln(3:0)=50 = 2:2 percent per year. Last, the household production
function is characterized by two parameters, viz  and . These have been estimated by
McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997). Their numbers are used here.21
6.1.2 Estimation
The rest of the parameters will be calibrated/estimated. First, a set of data targets is
picked. These targets summarize the data along ve dimensions: the time allocations for
both married and single households, the fraction of the population married, the divorce
rate, and the marriage rate. Second, the parameter values in question are then chosen to
maximize the models t with respect to these data targets. Specically, for this section,
dene edjt to be the j-th data target for period t. Let  be the vector of parameters to be
estimated. The model will yield a prediction for the j-th data target as a function of these
parameters and time, denoted by djt = D
j(; t). The estimation procedure solves
min

5X
j=1
f
X
t2T
Ijt !
j
t [edjt  Dj(; t)]2=[X
t2T
Ijt ]g; (P5)
where   (c; p1950; ; ; ; s; s; m; m; ), Ijt 2 f0; 1g is an indicator function returning a
value of 1 if there is an observation at date t, !jt gives the weight assigned to the target,
and T  f1950; 1960;    ; 2000g. Unlike the theory, the estimation does not restrict c  0
or  < 0; the data will decide the magnitudes and signs of these parameter.
Its interesting to compare this strategy for picking parameter values with the conven-
tional one employed in business cycle analysis, discussed in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
Business cycle analysis models short-run uctuations around a stationary mean. Hence, pa-
rameter values are typically picked so that the model matches up with some relevant long-run
averages from the data. In contrast, the current analysis focuses on long-run changes in a
nonstationary world. The strong trends observed in the data speak to the degree of curva-
ture in tastes and technologies. Thus, the information contained in these trends should be
21 The important parameter is the elasticity of substitution between goods and time in production, 1=(1 
). Chang and Schorfheide (2003) also nd that goods and time are substitutes in the household production
function. Their estimate is not far o¤ from McGrattan et al.s (1997).
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used to estimate parameter values. This is allowed by letting data targets at di¤erent points
in time enter into (P5). A discussion of the 10 parameters to be estimated and the 16 data
targets used to identify them will now follow.
Household Technology Parameters Time Allocations Obtaining a price series for
purchased household inputs is somewhat problematic. So, a time path of the form pt = p1950
e (t 1950) will be estimated here, where  is the rate of decline in the time-price for purchased
household inputs and p1950 is the initial price. The xed cost for household maintenance, c,
plays an important role in controlling the initial level of market work expended by singles
relative to married households. Nothing is known about its value, so it will also have to be
estimated. Thus, three household technology parameters will be estimated: c, p1950, and .
To match the model up with the data on time allocations, note that the fraction of time
spent by a married household on market work, lm, is given by lm = (2   hm)=2. Likewise,
the fraction of time spent by a single household working in the market is ls = 1  hs. Now,
note that lm and ls can be written as functions of the parameters to be estimated, namely
c, p1950; and . They are also functions of time, t, and the taste parameters  and . Thus,
write lmt = L
m(c; p1950; ; ; ; t; ) and lst = L
s(c; p1950; ; ; ; t).
To calculate the analogous numbers for the U.S. data, assume that there are 112 non-
sleeping hours in a week. Following the footsteps of McGrattan and Rogerson (1998), weekly
hours per married and single households can be calculated using U.S. Census Data. For each
decennial year between 1950 and 1990 the Census provides hours per week in following in-
tervals: 1-14, 15-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40, 41-48, 49-59, and more than 60 hours. Let Ei denote
the number of people that report hours in a particular interval i, ER represent the total
number of people reporting hours, E stand for the total number of people employed, and N
be the total population. Then, the fraction of total nonsleeping time allocated to the market
is calculated as
(7:5E1 14+22E15 29+32E30 34+37E35 39+40E40+44:5E41 48+42E49 59+62:5E60+)
1
ER
E
N
1
112
:
25
This fraction is computed by marital status for all males and females between ages 24 and
54. The fractions of total household time allocated to the market by married households,elm, and by single households, els, are then calculated as the averages across male and female
hours. Thus, an observation for elmt and elst is obtained for each decade t between 1950 and
1990, inclusive.
Now, to operationalize the above in (P5) let ed1t  elm, D1(; t)  Lm(c; p1950; ; ; ; t; ),ed2t  els, andD2(; t)  Ls(c; p1950; ; ; ; t; ) for t = 1950; 1960;    ; 1990. Also, set !1t=2 and
!2t=2 to be the fractions of married and single females in the time-t population of women.
(Note that !1t + !
2
t = 2 , the number of data targets for the time allocations.) The theory
developed suggests that the parameters c, p1950, and  will be important for determining
the time paths for hours worked. As a practical matter, it turns out that the time paths for
hours worked largely identify the magnitudes of c, p1950, and  note that, as was mentioned
earlier, the matching parameters, s; s; m; m; and , dont even enter into the L
m() and
Ls() functions.
Taste and Matching Parameters Vital Statistics There are seven taste and match-
ing parameters that need to be estimated; namely, , , s, s, m, m, and . Parameter
 determines the weight of market goods in the utility function, while the parameter  con-
trols the degree of concavity in the utility function for nonmarket goods. The more concave
this utility function is the faster households will move away from nonmarket goods toward
market goods as income rises. Hence, this parameter plays an important role in determining
how the relative benets of married versus single life respond to technological progress. The
idea here is that information on the trend in vital statistics is important for determining
the value of . The remaining six matching parameters govern the noneconomic aspects of
marriage again recall that Lm() and Ls() are not functions of the matching parameters.
These seven parameters impinge heavily on the models predictions concerning vital
statistics. Here, the data is targeted along three dimensions for two years, 1950 and
2000: the fraction of the population married, the divorce rate, and the marriage rate. So,
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let emj1950 and emj2000 denote the data targets along the j-th dimension for the years 1950
and 2000. Correspondingly, permit mj1950 = M
j(c; p1950; ; ; ; s; s; m; m; ; 1950) and
mj2000 = M
j(c; p1950,; ; s; s; m; m; ; 2000) to represent the models steady-state out-
put along the j-th dimension for the years 1950 and 2000. Hence, in (P5) set edj+2t  emjt ,
Dj+2(; t) M j(c; p1950; ; ; ; s; s; m; m; ; t) and !j+2t = 1, for j = 1; 2; 3 and t = 1950
and 2000. (Again, note that !3t+ !
4
t + !
5
t = 3, the number of data targets for the vital sta-
tistics.)
To summarize, the parameter vector   (c; p1950; ; ; ; s; s; m; m; ) is estimated so
that model matches the data on ve dimensions: the time allocations for married households,
the time allocations for single households, the fraction of the population married, the divorce
rate, and the marriage rate. This involves 16 observations from the U.S. data.22 Due to
the heavy time costs of simulating the full model, the parameter  was arbitrarily restricted
to lie in a 21-point discrete set A = f0:2;    ; 0:278;    ; 0:4g.23 The parameter values
obtained from the above procedure for matching the model with the data are presented in
Table 2. Before proceeding, note from Table 2 that the estimation procedure chooses c > 0,
 < 0, and  > 0. Therefore, when the simple structure outlined is estimated the data calls
for the presence of a xed cost in household production, a utility function for nonmarket
goods that is more concave than the one for market goods, and a declining time price for
purchased household inputs and, unlike the theory, none of these features are imposed on
the estimation procedure.
There is some indirect evidence, both cross sectional and time series, that there might
indeed be stronger diminishing marginal utility in nonmarket goods vis à vis market goods.
Households with higher incomes tend to allocate a larger share of their total food consump-
22 The estimation procedure employed is similar to one used by Andolfatto and MacDonald (1998). Given
the paucity of observations there is little point in adding an error structure to the estimation.
23 This set contains the value of  calibrated by Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) for a business cycle
model that includes household production and does not put leisure into the utility function. It also contains
the value suggested by Cooley and Prescott (1995) for the standard real business cycle model. The results
obtained are not that sensitive to the choice of . Hence, this restriction is not that severe. Also, the spacing
between the points in A is not linear. The set is rened over 3 successive iterations so that the points are
clustered the closest around the optimal solution  = 0:278.
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tion for food away from home. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007, Table
1, p. 7), in 2005 food away from home was about 35 percent of total food consumption for
households in the bottom income quintile, while the same share for those at the top income
quintile was 50 percent. During the last century as incomes rose so did the share of food,
housing and household operation in personal consumption expenditure fell. Such spending
constituted about 56 percent of total expenditure in 1929, while they were about 40 percent
of total expenditure in 2000U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
Table 2: Parameter Values
Category Parameter Values Criteria
Tastes  = 0:960 (1  ),  = 0:766; a priori information
 = 0:278,  =  1:845 estimated vital statistics
Technology c = 0:131, estimated hours data
 = 0:206,  = 0:189 a priori information
Life span 1= = 47 a priori information
Shocks s =  4:195; 2s = 8:002; estimated vital statistics
m = 0:562, 
2
m = 0:698;  = 0:897
Prices p1950 = 10:759;  = 0:060; estimated hours data
pt = p1950  e (t 1950) for t = 1951; :::; 2000
Wages w1950 = 1:00; normalization
wt = w1950  e0:022(t 1950) for t = 1951; :::; 2000 a priori information
6.2 Results
Visualize the economy in 1950. Wages are low and the price for purchased household inputs
is high, at least relative to 2000. Over time wages grow and the price for purchased household
inputs falls. The time paths for wages and prices inputted into the analysis are shown in
Figure 4. As can be seen, in the U.S. data wages increase 3.0 times over the time period
in question. Prices are estimated to decline by a factor of 20. This seems large, but it is
merely the result of compounding a 6.0 percent annual decline over a 50-year period. Can
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these two facts help to explain the decline in marriage and the rise in divorce over the last
50 years? This is the question asked here.
6.2.1 Household Hours
The time path for household hours that arises from the model is shown in Figure 5. It mimics
the U.S. data reasonably well. In particular, the model matches very well the sharp increase
in the fraction of time devoted to market work by married households. This is due to the
declining price for purchased household inputs. Purchased household inputs and housework
are substitutes in household production. As the price of purchased household inputs declines,
households substitute away from using labor at home toward using goods. The model has
trouble mimicking the enigmatic U -shaped pattern for single households  still, note the
presence of an attenuated U , though. It does a reasonable job at predicting the rise in
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participation from 1970 on.24 Observe that in 1950 married households devoted a smaller
fraction of their time to market work than did single ones, both in the data and model. In the
model this derives from the xed cost of household maintenance.25 This forces low-income
households to work more than high-income ones. In the model the low-income households
are singles. As wages rise this e¤ect disappears. By 1990 in the U.S. married households
worked more than singles ones did. This is surprising since married households are much
more likely to have children. In the model, they work about the same. Perhaps, in the real
world, more productive individuals are also more desirable on the marriage market. Indeed,
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) provide evidence that this is the case. Such a marriage-selection
e¤ect is missing in the model.
The estimation procedure picks a 6.0 percent annual rate of price decline, as was men-
tioned. This looks reasonable. For instance, the Gordon quality-adjusted time price index
24 The estimation scheme weights marrieds and singles by their prevalence in the population. Instead
re-estimate the household technology parameters, holding xed the tastes and matching parameters (except
for ), just using the hours data for singles from 1970 on. Doing this results in c = 0:051, p1950 = 0:8836,
and  = 0:021. The model then ts this rising portion of single hours nearly perfectly it still cant get the
U shape, though. The t for married labor supply is a little worse, but not bad. The predictions for vital
statistics are very close to the ones currently obtained, when  =  3:5. Note that a higher value for  is
picked to compensate for the lower rate of price decline, . For predicting the targets presented in Table 3,
the results never di¤er by more than an absolute value of 0:02, relative to the baseline model the di¤erence
is usually much smaller. Alternatively, one could use the whole series for singles hours. A U -shaped pattern
emerges with some worsening of t elsewhere. The overall t for the model isnt noticeably better for either
of these two estimation schemes.
25 Suppose that married and single households have di¤erent xed costs, m and s. Re-estimating the
model, holding xed the taste and matching parameters (except for ), results in m = 0:1585, s = 0:1366,
p1950 = 15:116, and  = 0:068. Not surprisingly, the xed cost for married households is bigger than the one
for singles. The t for married female labor supply is now slightly better, while the one for singles is about
the same. More or less the same predictions for the vital statistics are obtained (when  =  1:845 and the
other taste and matching parameters are held xed). The results for the targets presented in Table 3 never
di¤er by more than an absolute value of 0:004, relative to the baseline model.
One could also add a xed cost for household maintenance expressed in terms of nonmarket goods; i.e.,
rewrite the nonmarket goods part of the utility function as (1   )[(n   n)=z]=, where n is the xed
cost and z = 1; 2 is household size. A re-estimation of the household technology parameters for the model
(holding xed the other parameter values) established that this version of the model matched the hours
worked data about as well as the benchmark model. At the old taste and matching parameter values, there
are too many marriages in 1950. This is because the incentives to get married are now even higher. On this,
the estimation scheme also picks a larger value for c (= 0:1463) in the presence n (= 0:0919) to keep singles
working in market. The taste and matching parameters can be jiggled however so that this version of the
model gives about as good (or bad) results as before.
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Figure 5: Household Hours, 1950-1990 U.S. Data and Model.
for air conditioners, clothes dryers, dishwashers, microwaves, refrigerators, TVs, VCRs, and
washing machines fell at 10 percent a year over the postwar period. Alternatively, one could
take the price of kitchen and other household appliances from the National Income and
Product Accounts. This price series declined, relative to wage growth, at about 1.5 per-
cent a year since 1950. The 6 percent estimate obtained here is the midpoint of these two
numbers.26
6.2.2 Vital Statistics
Now, the model starts o¤ from an initial steady state that resembles the U.S. in 1950 and
converges to a nal one looking like the U.S. in 2000. In 1950 about 81.6 percent of the
female population was married (out of non-widows who were between the ages of 18 to 64).
There were 10.6 divorces per 1,000 married females, and 211 marriages. According to Schoen
26 Once again, evidence on technological progress in the household sector is presented in Greenwood,
Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) and Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005). There is no need to
revisit it here.
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(1983) marriages lasted about 30 years in 1950. In 2000 the picture was quite di¤erent. Only
62.5 percent of females were married. The divorce rate had risen to 23 divorces by 1995, and
the marriage rate had declined to about 80 marriages.27 Finally, the average duration of
marriages was about 20 to 24 years.28 Table 3 shows the models performance along these
dimensions. Note that singles face a distribution with a low mean and a high variance, while
married people face a distribution that has relatively a high mean, low variance, and high
autocorrelation see Table 2. This has two e¤ects. First, it encourages singles to wait a
while until a good match comes along. Second, it generates the long durations of marriages
observed in the data.
Table 3: the initial and final steady states
1950 2000
Model Data Model Data
Fraction married 0.818 0.816 0.678 0.625
Probability of divorce 0.011 0.011 0.026 0.023
Probability of marriage 0.131 0.211 0.094 0.082
Duration of marriages 31.31 29.63 21.47 20 to 24
The fraction of the population that is married declines with the passage of time in the
model. Figure 6 compares results obtained from the model with the U.S. data. The model
can explain 14 percentage points of the observed 19 percentage point decline in the number
of married females. This seems reasonable since other things went on in the world, such as
a rise in the number of people going to college, a decline in fertility, etc. Observe that the
27 Divorce and marriage statistics from the National Center for Health Statistics are not available after
1996.
28 There are not any recent estimates for the duration of marriages. Schoen and Standish (2001) estimate
that the duration of marriages to be about 24 years in 1995, while Espenshade (1985) estimates it to be 22.5
years for white females and 14.6 for black females over the period 1975-1980.
The steady-state duration of marriages in the model is given by
dm =
1
1  mm(1  ) ;
where mm is the probability of a married agent remaining married next period.
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utility di¤erential between married and single life declines over time.29 30 This occurs for
two reasons. First, recall that the utility function for nonmarket goods is more concave than
the one for market goods. Thus, high-income households (married couples) spend less on
household inputs relative to market consumption than do low-income household (singles).
As a consequence, a fall in the price of purchased household inputs has a bigger impact on
singles vis à vis married couples. Second, as wages rise the importance of the xed cost
for household maintenance disappears. This is more important for single households than
married ones. Finally, many couples choose to live together but not marry. The framework
can be thought of as modelling couples living together. The fraction of females living with
a male fell by 16 percentage points between 1960 and 2000.31 From this angle, the model
captures about 88 percent of the decline between 1950 and 2000.32 Interestingly, the model
seems to do well predicting the number of marriages for the rst half of the sample, and the
number of cohabitations for the later.
Underlying the decline in the fraction of the U.S. population that is married is a rise in
the divorce rate and a decline in the rate of marriage. This is true for the model too, as can
be seen in Figure 7. In the model divorces rise from 11 to 26, per 1,000 married women.
This compares with 11 to 23 in the data. Marriages, in the model, fall from about 131 to
94 per 1,000 unmarried women. In the data they dropped from 141 to 69 or from 211 to 82,
depending on the measure preferred. Thus, by either measure, the drop in marriages in the
model is a little anemic. Again, it is not surprising that the model does not do well in this
29 In line with the discussion surrounding Lemma 2 the compensating di¤erential needed to make a single
as well o¤ as a married person only falls from 20.7 percent to 17.7. This small decline is due to the fact that
the xed cost, c, is only a small fraction of the value of a singles time endowment, w.
30 Choo and Siow (2006) estimate a non-transferable utility model of the U.S. marriage market. Their
estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell sharply between 1971 and 1981.
31 The fraction of females living with a male is dened to be the fraction of females who are married plus
the fraction of females who are unmarried living with a male. The size of this latter group is tabulated using
the Census Bureaus posslqhousehold variable persons of the opposite sex living together. This variable
unfortunately also includes people who arent partners. Still, it probably is a good proxy for the number of
cohabitations.
32 Note that the number of unmarried couples living together before 1960 would have been small and can
be safely ignored.
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Figure 6: The Decline in Marriage, 1950-2000 U.S. Data and Model.
regard. Some important factors have been left out, such as the rise in education that surely
must be associated with the delay in rst marriages, or a narrowing in the gender gap that
may have promoted female labor-force participation and made single life a more desirable
option for females.33 Last, in the data the duration of a marriage was 30 years in 1950.
By 2000 this had declined to 20 years. The model does well in this regard. It predicts that
duration of a marriage was 31 years in 1950 and 21 years in 2000.34
33 Regalia and Rios-Rull (2001) show that the decline in the gender gap played a signicant role in the
rise of single households during the 1970-1990 period.
34 Recall that the estimation strategy uses information on the trends in labor supply and vitals statistics
over the entire sample to identify the key parameters c, , and . To check for the robustness of this
strategy, the model was partially re-estimated (over the c, , p1950, and  parameters) to t the 1950 to 1970
subperiod. In particular, for c = 0:1459,  = 0:068, p1950 = 16:219, and  =  1:7, the model did a good job
matching labor supply and vital statistics for the subperiod. Using these estimates the models predictions
for the year 2000 were then generated. They are surprisingly close to the benchmark model. The results for
1950 are: fraction married, 0.827; probability of divorce, 0.010; probability of marriage, 0.135; duration of
marriages, 32.20. For 2000 the corresponding gures are 0.675, 0.026, 0.093, and 21.33.
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Figure 7: Rates of Marriage and Divorce, 1950-1996 U.S. Data and Model
7 1920-2000: A Proposed Extension
The e¤ects of technological progress on the formation of households were beginning to per-
colate before World War II. How are these e¤ects manifested in data? Can the model be
modied to address them?
7.1 The Marriage Data
Figure 8 plots the proportion of the female population that was married from 1880 to 2000.35
About 72 percent of the population was married in 1900, as opposed to 62 percent in 2000.
So, 10 percentage points less women were married at the end of the 20th century relative
to the beginning. Observe that the number of marriages shows a \-shaped pattern roughly
coinciding with the baby boom years. This pattern is not as dramatic as it seems at rst
glance. The population was much younger at the turn of the last century than it is today.
35 The facts reported in this Section are based on tabulations from data obtained from the U.S. Census,
downloaded from IPUMS-USA, Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota.
35
Women aged 18 to 30 made up 44 percent of the population in 1900. Now, they account for
26 percent. Young women are much less likely to be married than older ones. Figure 8 also
shows the fraction of the female population that are married after making a correction for
the shift in the age distribution.36 First, note that much more females were married at the
beginning of the century as opposed to the end, about 17 percentage points more. Second,
the hump is still there, but it is much less pronounced. What can account for this hump-
shaped pattern in marriage? Specically, why did the number of marriages rise between
1940 and 1960, and subsequently decline?
7.2 Living Arrangements of Young Adults
At the beginning of the 20th century the vast majority of never-married young females
(close to 80 percent) lived as dependents with their parents. A substantial fraction lived
in households as non-relatives; viz, boarders, servants, etc. Almost none lived in their own
household, however. The fraction of young stand-alone households made up by singles has
become much more prevalent over time. It has risen from close to zero at the turn of the last
century to about 50 percent today, as Figure 9 illustrates.37 Additionally, Figure 9 plots
36 The adjustment is done using the typical method employed by demographers. Let p denote the total
female population at a point in time. Suppose that this population is made up of I age groups. Dene pi to
represent the number of women in the i-th age group and allow mi to proxy for the number of these women
who are married. The fraction of married females in the total population is then given by
f =
IX
i=1
mi
pi
pi
p
:
Hence, f depends both on the age composition of the population (or the pi=p terms) and on the fraction of
each age group who is married (or the mi=pi terms). Now, for any year t dene an age-adjusted measure by
bft = IX
i=1
mi;t
pi;t
pi;2000
p2000
:
Thus, bft calculates the fraction of women that would be married if the age composition of 2000 was in e¤ect
at time t.
37 In Figure 9 an independent single female is dened to be a never-married woman who is either the
head of a household, or the friend or partner of a householder. The curve labeled single, on owngraphs
this group relative to all single females. The curve marked marriedshows the number of married females
relative to the number of married plus independent single ones. The plots are restricted to women in the
36
1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
Year
60
65
70
75
80
M
ar
rie
d 
W
om
en
, 1
8-
64
, %
27
32
37
42
47
W
om
en
, 1
8-
30
, %
Married, Raw
Married, Age-Adjusted
Women,18-30
Figure 8: Marriage, 1880-2000.
1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
Year
50
60
70
80
90
100
M
ar
rie
d 
fe
m
al
es
, 1
8-
30
, %
 (o
f i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 fe
m
al
es
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
In
de
pe
nd
en
t s
in
gl
e 
fe
m
al
es
, 1
8-
30
, %
Married
Single, on own
Single, incl college
Figure 9: Living Arrangements for Young Women, 1880-2000.
37
the proportion of young households made up by married couples. As can be seen, it fell from
nearly 100 percent at the turn of the last century to less than 50 percent today. Interestingly,
this plot shows a monotonic decline from roughly 1910 on; the hump has disappeared.
7.3 Returning to the Hypothesis
The idea here is that technological progress in the household sector made it feasible to es-
tablish smaller and smaller households. In the initial stages of development technological
advance made it easier for a young adult to leave his or her parents home and marry. As
household technology progressed further it became viable for young adults to leave home
and remain single. Therefore, the move by young adults from large to two-person house-
holds coincided with an increase in marriages while the subsequent shift toward one-person
households was associated with a decline. This hypothesis is consistent with the decline in
the fraction of total young households made up by married ones that was shown in Figure
9.
7.3.1 Altering the Setup
To gauge whether or not this hypothesis has promise consider the following simple extension
of the model. Let there now be three types of individuals: singles living at home with
their families (dubbed young adults), singles living in their own homes, and married couples
living in their own households. Suppose that a young adult living with his family receives
a momentary utility of H(w; p)  x. Here H(w; p) gives the economic benet from living at
home, as a function of the underlying state of the economy (w; p). The variable x represents
the psychic disutility from living at home (versus alone) so to speak. It is distributed across
the population according to the distribution function X. Each single starts adulthood living
at home with their families and must make a decision about whether or not to leave his
familys home. Assume that a young adult leaves home single and then looks for a mate.
Once departed, he can never return. Also presume that a family realizes no benet from a
18-to-30 age group.
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child staying at home. The rest of the setup remains the same as before. The analysis will
focus on steady states.
The criteria underlying a young adults decision about whether or not to move out is
summarized below.
Table 4: Decision to leave home
Leave Home if W (w; p)  [H(w; p)  x]=[1  (1  )]
Remain Home if W (w; p) < [H(w; p)  x]=[1  (1  )]
A young adult will leave home when the benet from independent single life, W (w; p),
exceeds the benet from living with his family, [H(w; p)  x]=[1  (1  )]. Now, dene x
by the equation
W (w; p) = [H(w; p)  x]=[1  (1  )]:
Clearly, a young person will leave home when x  x, and will stay there when x < x.
The number of people deciding to live at home will be given by X(x). Now, consider
an increase in wages or a fall in the prices. These will lead to reductions in the number
of young adults living at home so long as the benets of independent single life rise more
than the benets of a dependent one; i.e., so long as W1(w; p) > H1(w; p)=[1  (1  )] or
W2(w; p) < H2(w; p)=[1 (1  )]. The considerations ensuring this are likely to be parallel
to those outlined in the Section 5, as will be seen.
Note that problems (P1) and (P2) remain the same as before, since the decision to leave
home is irreversible and because a married couple realizes no utility from a child living at
home. In a steady state the equation specifying the type distribution for marriages will
appear as
M(b) = (1  )
Z
M\[0;b]
Z
dM(ebjb 1)dM 1(b 1) + f(1  )s+ [1 X(x)]gZ
M\[0;b]
dS(eb);
with Z
dM(b) + s+X(x) = 1; [cf. (5)]:
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Therefore, a huge virtue of this setup is that it involves little modication to the original
formulation.
7.3.2 An Example
Does the above setup have promise for extending the earlier analysis to the pre-World War II
period? To address this question, the models potential will be demonstrated using a simple
example. The example will focus on three years, to wit 1920, 1950 and 2000. For each
year the models steady state will be computed. The output from the model will then be
compared with the stylized facts discussed in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. It should be emphasized
that given the simplicity of the setup, the example is intended only as an illustration; it
should not be viewed as a serious data-tting exercise.
For the taste and technological parameters, take the values presented in Table 2 with
two changes. Presumably the price for purchased household inputs fell faster earlier in
the last century than later on. So, allow the price to fall at the constant rate 1920 prior
to 1950. Additionally, the xed cost for household formation will be allowed to di¤er for
this subperiod as well. Denote this by c1920. The above setup changes the pool of singles
that are available on the marriage market. So, new matching parameters will be selected.
These values will apply for the whole 1920 to 2000 period. Something must be specied
for the economic benet that a young adult derives from staying at home with his parents,
H(w; p). Simply suppose that each family has two kids and set H(w; p) = I(4; p; w). That
is, each period a young adult who stays at home realizes the maximal level of momentary
utility that would arise in a household with four wage earners. [One could just as easily set
H(w; p) = #I(4; p; w) for some # 2 (0; 1). The essential requirement is that the economic
benet of living in a large household should decline over time relative to a small one.] Last,
the distribution X governing the disutility from living at home with ones parents will be
represented by a discrete distribution that approximates (over a range covering the three
steady-state values for x) a normal distribution with a mean and variance denoted by x
and 2x. Given the primitive nature of the example, the parameters values are selected so that
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the models steady states display some features of interest, discussed below. The parameter
values selected are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: New Parameter Values example
Household Production c1920 = 0:161, 1920 = 0:172
Shocks s =  3:75, 2s = 8
m = 0:6, 
2
m = 0:9,  = 0:7
Utility of Living at Home H(w; p) = I(4; p; w)
Disutility of Living at Home x = 1:999, 
2
x = 2:794
In the model 63.8 percent of single women work in 1920, the same number as in the data
for women between the ages of 18 and 64 see Table 6. Likewise, only 7.8 percent of married
women work in 1920, again the same as is observed in the data. By construction, the model
still generates the hours-worked predictions shown in Figure 5 for the period 1950-1990.38
This transpires because the hours-worked decisions are functions solely of the taste and
technology parameters, and these havent been changed for the 1950 to 2000 period. Table
7 presents the results for some vital statistics.39 The statistics for the U.S. data apply to
women in the 18-to-64 age group (as in Table 3). The numbers have also been adjusted for
the shift in U.S. age distribution, which was discussed earlier. First, as can be seen, the
model replicates quite nicely the stylized facts for the fraction of females who are married.
38 Prior to 1950 it is not possible to obtain hours-worked data for married and single females. Thus, for
1920 labor-force participation rates are used instead. This is done by heroically assuming that the work
week is xed at 40 hours and that there are 112 nonsleeping hours in a week. It is also assumed that all
males work a 40 hour week. Denote the rates of participations for married and single females by fm1920 and
fs1920. Then, for the model f
m
1920 and f
s
1920 can be obtained from hours worked, h
m
1920 and h
s
1920, by using
the formulae
2  hm1920
2
=
40 + 40 fs1920
2 112 and 1  h
s
1920 =
40 + 40 fs1920
2 112 :
39 The numbers in Table 7 for the U.S. data derive as follows: First, the counts for the fractions of females
who are married, m, are taken from the data displayed in Figure 8. Second, in the model only never-married
females live at home. Suppose that this is true in the data as well. Then, X(x) is simply the fraction
of females who are single, never-married, and live at home. Third, s = 1   m   X(x). All numbers in
the table refer to women in the 18-to-64 age group and have been adjusted to control for shifts in the age
distribution of the population (in the manner discussed in Footnote 35).
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In particular, the model duplicates the \-shaped pattern displayed in the data.40 Second,
it also does a reasonable job predicting the decline in the proportion of single females that
live at home with their parents. Third, analogously, it mimics well the rise in fraction of
single females that live alone. All in all, it looks like an extension of the framework that
models the decision of a young adult to leave home has promise for explaining the trends in
vital statistics that are observed in the U.S. data.
Table 6: Participation Rates 1920
Model Data
Married 0.078 0.078
Single 0.638 0.638
Table 7: Household Living Arrangements
1920 1950 2000
Model Data Model Data Model Data
Married m 0.791 0.791 0.813 0.819 0.722 0.616
Single, Living at Home X(x) 0.186 0.185 0.126 0.125 0.109 0.109
Single, Living Alone s 0.023 0.024 0.061 0.056 0.169 0.275
7.3.3 Discussion
The proposed extension of the benchmark model is minimalist, to say the least. It is easy to
identify areas of the analysis that warrant further work. At the heart of the above extension
is a young adults decision to leave home. Perhaps one could allow for a young adult to
search for a mate while at home. Three options would then arise: stay at home, leave
home married, and leave home single. Doing this will be important for matching the rates
40 An improvement in tting the numbers for 2000 can be obtained at the sacrice of a diminution in the
left-hand side of the hump.
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of marriage that are observed in the data.41 In the earlier part of the last century most
females got engaged before they left home. Therefore, the model cannot hope to match the
observed rates of marriage at early dates if marriagability is restricted to the small pool of
single females living alone. Additionally, should searching for a mate while living in your
parents home be as e¢ cient as searching for one when you live alone? Modelling the utility
that a young adult receives while at home is another area where the framework could be
improved. Do transfers ow from young adults to parents, or vice versa? The answer to this
will depend upon how parents care about their kids, how children feel about their parents,
and their mode of interaction.
8 Conclusions
The fraction of adult females who are married has dropped by roughly 20 percentage points
since World War II. Females now spend a much smaller part of their adult life married than
50 years ago. Associated with this has been a rise in the divorce rate and a decline in the
rate of marriage. At the same time, hours worked by married households rose considerably.
This was driven by a large increase in labor-force participation by married females.
An explanation of these facts is o¤ered here. The story told focuses on technological
progress in both the household and market sectors. The idea is that investment-specic
technological progress in the household sector reduced the need to use labor at home. This
simultaneously allowed women to enter the labor force and eroded the economic incentives
for marriage. The analysis blends together a search model of marriage and divorce with a
model of household production. The economic incentives for marriage derive from economies
of scale in household production. These are whittled away overtime for two reasons. First,
rising wages make it easier to meet or exceed the xed cost for household maintenance.
This reduces the need to marry to make ends meet. Second, a falling price for labor-saving
household inputs has a bigger impact on single vis à vis married households, since the former
41 Since marriage and divorce rates are not available by age, it is not possible to calculate age-adjusted
rates for these data. The marriage rate could be very sensitive to age adjustment.
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devote a larger share of their spending to these products due to a high rate of diminishing
marginal utility for nonmarket consumption. These two e¤ects increase the (relative) value
of single life.42
So, where can the analysis go from here? Technological progress in the home and market
may a¤ect the pattern of matching in society. There is some evidence that the degree of
assortative mating in the U.S. has increased since 1940.43 Extensions of the model may
be able to capture this. Suppose that individuals di¤er in their labor market productivities.
Assume that married males devote all of their time to market work while married females split
their time between market work and household work. Now, when choosing a potential mate
their earnings on the labor market will be a consideration. This will matter less at early stages
of economic development, since married women will do little market work due to the large
amount of time spent in household production. As women start to work more in the market,
due to technological progress, it will begin to matter more. As an economy advances and
the benets from economies of scale in household consumption diminish, earnings potential
along with marital bliss will become more important criteria when choosing a mate. The
degree of assortative mating will increase. Additionally, such an analysis would likely imply
that the drop in the marriage rate should be biggest for those individuals in lower income
groups, since the relative benets from marriage will fall the most for them. Indeed, there
is some evidence suggesting that this has been the case.44
42 The economic forces that reduce the relative benet of single versus married life may also have a¤ected
other living arrangements, such as the incentives of the elderly to live with their kids. Between 1970 and
1990 the fraction of widows living alone rose from 52.1 to 64.2 percent. Bethencourt and Rios-Rull (2004)
argue that the rise in the relative income of elderly widows can account for a signicant part of the rise in
the number of elderly widows living alone between 1970 and 1990. In a similar vein, Pistaferri, Schoellmanz
and Tertilt (2005) argue a substantial proportion of the decline in household size is due to an increased
demand for privacy, made possible by rising living standards.
43 See Lam (1997) for some facts on the correlation of income levels across partners and Mare (2000) for
education.
44 See Wallace (2000) who nds that the decline in the marriage rate is inversely related to the level of
education.
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Figure 10: The Determination of h.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proofs
As a prelude to the proofs of the lemmas and propositions, combine (7) and (8) to obtain
d = [
(1  )p

]1=( 1)h  R(p)h: (12)
Using this in (6) then gives
c  c = w[(z   c
w
)  h]  wpd = w[(z   c
w
)  h]  wpR(p)h: (13)
Finally, by substituting (12) and (13) into (8) a single equation can be obtained in one
unknown, namely h:
[R(p) + (1  )]1 =h1  = (1  )(1  )z  [(z   c
w
)  h  pR(p)h]: (14)
The solution is portrayed in Figure 10. It is easy to deduce that the left-hand side of (14) is
increasing in h, since  < 0. It is trivial to see that the right-hand side is decreasing in h:
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Proof of Proposition 1. On (i), observe that both R(p) = f[(1 )=]pg1=( 1) and pR(p)
are decreasing in p, since 0 <  < 1. Therefore, the right-hand side of (14) falls with a drop
in p, as  pR(p) is increasing in p. Thus, the RHS curve in Figure 10 will shift down when
p declines. The left-hand side increases with a reduction in p because R(p) is decreasing
in p. Hence, the LHS curve shifts up. As a consequence, h unambiguously drops. For (ii)
and (iii), note that w and c only enter into (14) in the form c=w. Its trivial to see that the
right-hand side of (14) is decreasing in c=w, while the left-hand side is not a function of c=w.
Therefore, an increase in c=w will cause h to fall. The desired results follow immediately.
What is the relationship between the size of a household, on the one hand, and the
amount of time allocated to housework and spending on goods, on the other hand? One
would expect housework, h, to rise when size, z, increases because the total endowment of
time has risen. This is true. A more interesting question is whether or not housework rises
by a factor more or less than the proportionate increase in household size. On the one hand,
given that the utility function for nonmarket goods is more concave than the one for market
goods, the household has a preference for diverting extra resources into market consumption.
This suggests that housework will increase less than proportionately with size. On the other
hand, at higher levels of income the xed cost for household maintenance will matter less.
This propones that housework will rise more than proportionately with size. While the result
turns out to be ambiguous, a useful upper bound on the response of housework to household
size can be derived. This is presented in Lemma 3, which is an important step toward
proving Proposition 2. Using this upper bound, it can be shown that married households
spend less than single households do on the inputs into household production, d and h, at
least relative to market consumption, c  c.
Lemma 3 A rise in z by a factor of  > 1 leads to an increase in h by a factor strictly less
than  = (z c=w)=(z c=w). When  = 0 (ln utility for nonmarket goods) a magnication
in z by a factor of  > 1 will cause h to expand by exactly a factor of .
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Proof. Rewrite equation (14) as
[R(p) + (1  )]1 =h h+ (1  )(1  )(1 + pR(p))z h
= (1  )(1  )z (z   c=w):
If z increases by factor  > 1 then z  c=w rises by the factor   (z  c=w)=(z  c=w) > .
Now, the right-hand side rises by the factor  . Observe that if h rises by the factor 
then the left-hand side will increase by more than the factor  , because   >   when
 < 0 and 0 <  < 1. Therefore, to restore equality between the left-hand and right-hand
sides of the above equation, h must rise by less than the factor . The rst part of the lemma
has been established. Last, suppose that  = 0. In this case, (14) reduces to
h =
(1  )(1  )(z   c=w)
[R(p) + (1  )] + (1  )(1  )(1 + pR(p)) : (15)
The second part of the lemma follows immediately.
In line with the intuition presented above on the relationship between household size
and allocations, suppose that c = 0. In this case,  = . Thus, larger households will
devote proportionately less of their time to housework than smaller ones, since an increase
in household size by a factor  > 1 will lead to a rise in h by a factor less than  = . Next,
suppose that  = 0 and c> 0, so that both market goods and nonmarket goods have ln utility.
If z increases by a factor of  then h will rise by exactly the factor (z  c=w)=(z  c=w) > .
Now, larger households spend proportionately more of their time on housework relative to
smaller ones. This lemma will now be use in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, result (iii) is immediate from Lemma (3). Second, it is
easy to see that (ii) is implied by equation (12) and result (iii). By using (ii) and (iii), in
conjunction with equation (13), result (i) can be obtained. Last, the situation for  = 0 is
readily handled by using the closed-form solution (15).
Proof of Corollary. From Lemma 1, note that when   0 it transpires that (cm   c) 
2(cs   c), since [(2  c=w)=(1  c=w)]  2. Thus, (cm   c)=2  21 (cs   c) > (cs   c). Part
(ii) of the corollary follows trivially.
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Proof of Lemma 2. The solution to the expenditure problem (P4) is once again charac-
terized by (8) and (12) for z = 1, in conjunction with (11). Now, suppose that cm   c, dm,
and hm satisfy the married time-allocation problem or (P3) when z = 2. Then, it is easy
to show that ecs   c = (cm   c)=2, eds = dm=2, and ehs = hm=2 satisfy the expenditure
problem. Given this, it follows that ecs + pw eds + wehs = [(cm   c) + pwdm + whm]=2 + c
= (2w   c)=2 + c. The desired result obtains.
9.2 The Impact of Technological Progress on Marriage and Di-
vorce
The impact of technological progress on marriage and divorce will now be addressed. To this
end, note that by standard arguments [Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989, chaps. 4 and
9)] it can be shown that the married value function V is strictly increasing in b. Thus, there
is a unique value for b, or threshold t, that solves the equation V (b) = W . Furthermore,
V (b) R W as b R t. This allows the dynamic programming problems (P1) and (P2) to be
rewritten more simply as
W = us + 
Z t0
W 0dS(b0) + 
Z
t0
V 0(b0)dS(b0);
and
V (b) = um + b+ 
Z t0
W 0dM(b0jb) + 
Z
t0
V 0(b0)dM(b0jb);
where again us = I(1; p; w) and um = I(2; p; w).
It is now easy to show that a purely temporary decrease in the price for purchased
household inputs (dp < 0 with dp0 = dp00 =    = 0) will make individuals choosier about
their mates.
Lemma 4 A temporary one-shot decline in the price for purchased household inputs, p, will
cause the threshold, t , to rise.
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Proof. The above equations imply
t = us   um + 
Z t0
W 0dS(b0) + 
Z
t0
V 0(b0)dS(b0)
 
Z t0
W 0dM(b0jb)  
Z
t0
V 0(b0)dM(b0jb):
Now note thatW 0, V 0 and t0 are una¤ected by a purely temporary price decrease. Therefore,
dt
dp
=
d(us   um)
dp
< 0;
by Proposition 2. Thus, a temporary decline in price will cause the threshold, t, to rise.
Since all individuals become more pickier about their mates, the rate of marriage will su¤er
a one period fall and the rate of divorce endure a one period increase.
To say much more, it looks like either some additional structure needs to be imposed on
the framework, or that the model needs to be simulated numerically. The latter strategy is
pursued in Section 6. Following the rst strategy, the stochastic structure of the model will
be simplied in way that is commonly done with search models.
Assumption Let the stochastic structure governing match quality be specied as follows:
(i) For single agents the cumulative distribution function S has bounded support with upper
bound b;
(ii) For married agents let b evolve in line with
b0 =
8<: = b; with Pr();= b; with Pr(1  );
where b< [U s(w; p) Um(w; p) ] with p representing the upper bound on the price for house-
hold products. The lower bound b is constructed so that it is never optimal to marry given
this match quality.
Given this, the dynamic programming problems for single and married agents, in a
stationary equilibrium, will appear as
W = us + 
Z
t
V (b)dS(b) + WS(t); (16)
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and
V (b) = um + b+ V (b) + (1  )W: (17)
Lemma 5 A decrease in the price for purchased household inputs, p, causes the steady-state
threshold level of match quality, t, to rise.
Proof. An equation characterizing the threshold, t, will be derived. To this end, rst rewrite
(17) as
V (b) =
um + b+ (1  )W
1   :
Now, use this in (16) to obtain an equation dening W :
[1     2(1  )  S(t)(1  )]W = (1  )us + 
Z
t
(um + b)dS(b):
Note that (17) can also be evaluated at b = t to get W = [um + t]=(1  ). This allows the
above equation to be converted into a condition specifying t. Specically, solving out for W
gives
[
1     2(1  )
1     S(t)](u
m + t) = (1  )us + 
Z
t
(um + b)dS(b);
which can be rearranged to read45
[1 + (1  )  S(t)](um + t) = (1  )us + 
Z
t
(um + b)dS(b):
This equation determines t. Integrating by parts the right-hand side of the above condition
yields
[1 + (1  )  S(t)](um + t) = (1  )us + um[1  S(t)] + b  tS(t)  
bZ
t
S(b)db;
which can be rewritten as
[1 + (1  )]t = (1  )(us   um) + b  
bZ
t
S(b)db:
45 Note that 1     2(1  ) = (1  )[1 + (1  )].
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Finally, di¤erentiate the above equation to get
dt
dp
=
(1  )
1 + (1  )  S(t)
d(us   um)
dp
< 0;
where the sign follows from Proposition 2. Hence, a decrease in price, p, will increase t.
So, how will a decrease in the steady-state price for purchased household inputs, p, a¤ect
the number of people who are married in a steady state? To answer this, let  represent
the steady-state fraction of people who are married and s denote the density function that
is associated with S. The fraction of people who are married in a steady state is determined
by the equation
 = (1  )[1  S(t)] + (1  );
so that
 =
1  S(t)
1 +    S(t) :
From this it is immediate that
d
dp
=
 
[1 +    S(t)]2 s(t)
dt
dp
> 0;
by Lemma 5. Thus, a fall in price will lead to a decrease in the fraction of the population
that is married.
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